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ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
By Denying Ownership Of The Lockbox And Its Contents Prior To The Search, Melling 
Abandoned Any Privacy Interest He May Have Had In Those Items And Therefore 
Lacks Standing To Challenge Their Search 
After Melling denied ownership of a lockbox and its contents multiple times, 
Officer Harward opened the unlocked lockbox and discovered "a black scale, a pipe 
with white crystal substance and some matches, as well as two fake identification 
cards." (R., p.52.) After placing Melling under arrest, Officer Harward asked Melling to 
separate his feet to facilitate a search for weapons and contraband, whereupon a glass 
pipe fell out of Melling's shorts and shattered on the ground. (R., pp.52-53.) Residue 
on the shattered pipe tested positive for methamphetamine, and additional 
methamphetamine was located on Melling's person at the jail. (R., p.53.) 
The state charged Melling with possession ofmethamphetamine. (R., pp.15-16.) 
Melling filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that it was obtained through an 
unlawful search and seizure. (R., pp.21-31.) The district court granted Melling's 
suppression motion on the theory that, because Melling denied owning the lockbox in 
an apparent effort to avoid criminal liability for contraband contained within the lockbox, 
his abandonment did not divest him of his privacy interest related to that property. (R., 
pp.51-59). 
The state appealed, arguing that by denying ownership of the lockbox and its 
contents prior to the search, 1 Melling disavowed any privacy interest he may have had 
in the lockbox and its contents. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-7.) Because "[a] person 
challenging a search has the burden of showing he or she had a legitimate expectation 
1 In fact, Melling denied ownership of the lockbox and its contents prior to any inquiry 
by police regarding the lockbox or its contents. (See R., p.52.) 
1 
of privacy in the item or place to be searched," State v. Pruss, 145 Idaho 623, 626, 181 
P.3d 1231, 1234 (2008), and because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
voluntarily abandoned property, State v. Harwood, 133 Idaho 50, 52, 981 P.2d 1160, 
1162 (Ct. App. 1999) (citation omitted), the district court erred by granting Melling's 
suppression motion. 
The only issue before this Court is whether Melling's denial of ownership of the 
lockbox and its contents prior to any search of those items constitutes abandonment. 
That issue is controlled by precedent. In State v. Zaitseva, 135 Idaho 11, 13, 13 P.3d 
338, 340 (2000), the Idaho Supreme Court held that, "by denying ownership of the bag 
in response to the officer's inquiry prior to the search, Zaitseva essentially relinquished 
or abandoned any privacy interest in the contents of the bag.II Likewise, by denying 
ownership of the lockbox and its contents prior to the search, Melling abandoned any 
privacy interest in those items. 
Idaho jurisprudence requires respect for its own precedents. The rule of stare 
decisis dictates that controlling precedent be followed "unless it is manifestly wrong, 
unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is 
necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice." 
State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002). But Melling does not argue in 
his Respondent's brief that Zaitseva should be overruled. Instead he asserts that its 
holding should be ignored, claiming that Zaitseva "does not provide a bright-line rule for 
abandonment." (Respondent's brief, pp.10-11.) To support this contention, Melling 
advances two arguments: (1) that the Court's holding in Zaitseva is merely dicta; and (2) 
that "any rule from Zaitseva is not binding on this case because abandonment is a fact-
2 
specific inquiry" and, he asserts, Zaitseva is factually distinguishable. (Id.) Both 
arguments fail. 
First, Melling asserts that Zaitseva's "abandonment of the bag was not the 
essential or primary reason to uphold the search of the container" because "the focus of 
the Court's discussion was on consent." (Respondent's brief, p.10.) Melling also 
characterizes the Court's conclusions regarding abandonment as an "alternative, 
supplemental means to uphold the search." (Id.) But an alternate holding is still a 
holding-not dicta-and is binding. 
Moreover, this supposed alternate holding was likely necessary to support the 
ultimate search of the bag under the facts of that case. Zaitseva was a passenger in a 
vehicle that was pulled-over for speeding. Zaitseva, 135 Idaho at 12, 13 P.3d at 339. 
Both the driver and Zaitseva consented to a search of the car. ~ While exiting the 
vehicle the driver attempted to remove a bag from the car, but was ordered to return the 
bag to the car by the officers when "[b]oth Zaitseva and the driver denied ownership of 
the bag." ~ Officers then searched the bag, finding evidence which led to Zaitseva's 
charges. ~ 
Generally, consent to search a vehicle will include consent to search containers 
in that vehicle. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991). However, consent may be 
limited and, "when the basis for a search is consent, the government must conform to 
the limitations placed upon the right granted to search." State v. Thorpe, 141 Idaho 
151, 154, 106 P.3d 477, 480 (Ct. App. 2004) (citations omitted). Moreover, even under 
the search incident to arrest exception, a police officer cannot create a right to search 
by forcing the occupant of a vehicle to leave a purse in the vehicle. State v. Newsom, 
3 
132 Idaho 698, 979 P.2d 100 (1998). Thus in Zaitseva, because the driver attempted to 
limit the scope of her consent by removing the bag from the vehicle, her and Zaitseva's 
abandonment of any reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag or its contents, based 
on their denials of ownership, would have been necessary for officers to lawfully search 
the bag. 
Melling also argues that Zaitseva is factually distinguishable from this case and 
so not binding. (Respondent's brief, pp.10-11.) First Melling notes that police in 
Zaitseva searched a container in a vehicle whereas the officer in this case searched a 
container on the front lawn of Melling's residence and, he argues, there is a greater 
expectation of privacy in objects in front lawns than in objects in cars. (Respondent's 
brief, p.11.) But this distinction is irrelevant to the issue of abandonment. Whatever 
expectation of privacy Melling may have had in his front lawn is not at issue in this case; 
there is no argument that Officer Harward was not lawfully present on Melling's front 
lawn when Melling's girlfriend threw the lockbox at the officer's feet. Where the suspect 
has denied ownership of the container and its contents, he has disavowed any 
reasonable expectation of privacy in that container or its contents. The question is what 
reasonable expectation of privacy Melling had in the lockbox, not in his front lawn. And 
any reasonable expectation of privacy he may have had in the lockbox was disavowed 
when he abandoned it. 
Second, Melling asserts that in Zaitseva "both the driver of the vehicle and the 
defendant denied ownership of the bag," whereas in this case "there is no evidence that 
more than one individual denied ownership of the lockbox." (Respondent's brief, p.11.) 
It should be noted that by repeatedly claiming that the lockbox belonged to Melling {R., 
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p.52), Melling's girlfriend necessarily denied that the lockbox was hers, so this 
distinction does not exist. More importantly, any such distinction would again be 
irrelevant to the issue before this Court. If one person denies owning a container prior 
to its search, then that individual has relinquished any reasonable expectation of privacy 
he or she may have had in the container or its items. Likewise, if 100 people deny 
owning a container prior to its search, then those individuals have each relinquished 
whatever reasonable expectation of privacy each may have had in the container or its 
items. Whether the defendant is the one individual who disavowed having a reasonable 
expectation of privacy or one of 100 individuals who disavowed having a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, that defendant still cannot demonstrate that he now has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy to bring a Fourth Amendment challenge against the 
search of the abandoned property. 
Finally, Melling argues that, unlike in Zaitseva, there were reasonable indicia that 
Melling owned the lockbox and the officer in this case "in fact believed" that Melling was 
the true owner of the lockbox. (Respondent's brief, p.11.) Again, this is irrelevant to the 
question of abandonment. Officers conducting trash pulls have "reasonable indicia" that 
the garbage they are sifting through belongs to the suspects, but the discarded property 
is still abandoned. Officers in pursuit likely believe that the contraband suspects 
attempt to discard along roadways or under bushes is in fact the suspects' property, but 
those suspects have still essentially relinquished any reasonable expectation of privacy 
which may have attached to that abandoned property. Likewise, when a suspect denies 
ownership of property prior to its search, he has "essentially relinquished or abandoned 
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any privacy interest in the contents" of that property. Zaitseva, 135 Idaho at 13, 13 P.3d 
at 340. 
On appeal, Melling invites this Court to disregard its precedent and instead adopt 
the theory espoused in one legal treatise that "a mere disclaimer of ownership in an 
effort to avoid making an incriminating statement in response to police questioning" is 
insufficient to show abandonment. 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure§ 11.3(f) (5th 
ed.). Contrary to Melling's assertion (see Respondent's brief, p.12), this is not the 
"prevailing view." Rather it seems most jurisdictions, like Idaho, have held that denying 
ownership of an item abandons any reasonable expectation of privacy in that object, 
and therefore defendants lack standing to later challenge searches of the abandoned 
item. Professor LaFave offers numerous examples of jurisdictions which employ this 
rule, including United States v. Torres, 949 F.2d 606, 608 (2nd Cir. 1991) (defendant 
lacked standing where she claimed a shoulder bag she was carrying belonged to her 
mother and that she lacked knowledge of its contents); United States v. Williams, 538 
F.2d 549, 550-51 (4th Cir. 1976) (defendant's disclaimer of ownership of his briefcase 
was analogous to abandonment); United States v. Powell, 732 F.3d 361, 374-75 (5th 
Cir. 2013) (defendant "abandoned the cell phone" when "she disclaimed personal 
connection to the phone" and so "lack[ed] standing to challenge the admissibility of the 
phone and the records contained therein"); United States v. Peters, 194 F.3d 692, 695-
96 (6th Cir. 1999) (defendant lacked standing to challenge the search of a bag police 
saw him carry onto the bus, because he disclaimed ownership); United States v. 
Alexander, 573 F.3d 465, 473 (7th Cir. 2009) (defendant's "disclaim[ing] that the vehicle 
was his" was sufficient "to establish abandonment despite the officers' belief that the 
6 
[car] was his" (emphasis added)); United States v. Decoud, 456 F.3d 996, 1007-08 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (where defendant claimed a briefcase found in his car did not belong to him, 
he lacked standing); United States v. Tubens, 765 F.3d 1251, 1256-57 (10th Cir. 2014) 
(defendant lacked standing to challenge search of carry-on bag found in bus after he 
"asserted unequivocally that the bag was not his"); United States v. McBean, 861 F.2d 
1570, 1573 (11th Cir. 1988) (defendant lacked standing to challenge search of 
suitcases in the trunk of his car where he abandoned that property by claiming the 
luggage was not his); see also United States v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294, 1302-03 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990) (when defendant denied owning bag, she abandoned it for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment). Professor LaFave also offers several additional examples from 
various state courts. In contrast, he offers only one example of a court which has 
adopted Melling's proposed exception: State v. Isom, 641 P.2d 417 (Mont. 1982). See 
6 Search & Seizure § 11.3(e) n.358. The state has already addressed that case in its 
Appellant's brief. (See id., pp.6-7.) 
In his Respondent's brief, Melling also suggests that State v. Evans, 150 P.3d 
105 (Wash. 2007), and State v. Johnson, 193 A.2d 1185 (N.J. 2008), support his 
proposed avoiding self-incrimination exception to abandonment.2 Review, however, 
shows that neither case is applicable. First, Washington has an automatic standing 
rule. Evans, 150 P.3d at 108. Idaho, however, has no automatic standing rule; rather, 
as noted above, "[a] person challenging a search has the burden of showing he or she 
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the item or place to be searched." Pruss, 145 
2 Melling also cites to State v. Cook, 34 P.3d 156 (Or. 2001), a case which was decided 
specifically under the Oregon Constitution, see 34 P.3d at 161, not the Fourth 
Amendment and certainly not the Idaho Constitution. 
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Idaho at 626, 181 P .3d at 1234. Relying on the automatic standing rule and the state's 
constitutional privacy protections exceeding those of the federal constitution, the Evans 
court concluded that denial of ownership would not "divest [the defendant] of a privacy 
interest in that property, provided the search takes place in an area where the 
defendant had a privacy interest." Evans, 150 P.3d at 110-11. The court also noted 
that the property, a briefcase found during a consent-based search of a vehicle, was 
locked and the defendant objected to its seizure. kl at 111. Neither of these facts is 
present in Melling's case. (See R., p.52.) 
New Jersey's unique standing rules were also a key factor in the Johnson 
decision. In that case, police entered an apartment occupied by five people with an 
arrest warrant for the defendant. Johnson, 193 A.2d at 1197. The police seized and 
searched a duffle bag after both the defendant and another occupant denied owning the 
duffle bag. kl The court noted that "New Jersey's broad rule of standing protects the 
privacy rights of not just the accused, but also others in a home who might not have a 
ready forum in which to make their voices heard." kl at 1197-98. Therefore, despite 
the defendant's denial, the property still was not "abandoned" because that denial "did 
not forfeit the rights of the other occupants of the apartment ... to have their 'effects' 
subjected to an unreasonable search," and "the police might still have easily determined 
[the bag's] owner." kl at 1197. 
Whatever the merits of these cases, this Court should reject Melling's proposed 
"attempting to avoid incrimination" exception to abandonment. Contrary to his 
argument, there is no right against self-incrimination; rather, the Fifth Amendment 
provides a right against compelled self-incrimination. See U.S. Const. Am. V ("No 
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person shall .. be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. ... "). 
While, to protect that constitutional right, the Supreme Court announced in Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the prophylactic right to remain silent during custodial 
interrogations, even that right must be affirmatively invoked. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 
560 U.S. 370, 381-82 (2010). Suspects may invoke the right simply by stating that they 
are exercising the right not to incriminate themselves. kl at 382. Lying to the police "to 
avoid incrimination" is not the equivalent of invoking the right against compelled self-
incrimination. See,~' Mills v. United States, 708 A.2d 1003, 1008 (D.C. App. 1997) 
(contention that defendant "was entitled not to incriminate himself by volunteering his 
connection to the incriminating evidence in the car" rejected as "nothing in the record 
manifests any intention" to "assert his privilege against self-incrimination"). 
Melling, again citing to Professor LaFave's treatise, also contends that "a mere 
denial of ownership cannot constitute abandonment when the police are on notice that a 
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in property based on something other 
than ownership." (Respondent's brief, p.12.) An example of this rule is found in the 
case of Robles v. Indiana, 510 N.E.2d 660, 663 (Ind. 1987), where a passenger denied 
owning luggage, but still had a legitimate expectation of privacy because he was the 
bailee and "admitted he was transporting the bag." But that rule is inapplicable to the 
instant case. Far from admitting any connection to the lockbox or its contents, Melling 
"stated he had never seen the box before and had no idea who it belonged to," and he 
claimed "that nothing in the box was his." (R., p.52.) 
A suspect may not simultaneously disavow and assert a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in items of property. By repeatedly denying, prior to a search, his ownership 
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of the lockbox and its contents, Melling abandoned any reasonable expectation of 
privacy he may have had in those items. Zaitseva, 135 Idaho at 13, 13 P.3d at 340. 
Having disavowed his reasonable expectation of privacy, he cannot meet his burden of 
showing that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the abandoned container. 
Harwood, 133 Idaho at 52, 981 P.2d at 1162. The district court erred in concluding 
otherwise. The district court's suppression order should therefore be reversed and this 
case remanded for further proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
granting Melling's suppression motion and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 15th day of December, 2015. 
0 W77::>.-//,Y 
Deputy Attorney General 
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